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How should we respond to states that deliberately displace their own populations? While the international
refugee regime is anchored in the 1951 Refugee Convention and the work of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Convention is silent on the question of state culpability, and the
UNHCR's Statute established its entirely non-political character. Although rarely applied, four forms of
complementary enforcement mechanisms already exist that could be used to limit and deter deliberate
displacement by states: the UN Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic Review mechanism; soft and
regional law, such as the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement; international criminal law at the
individual level, where deportation and forcible transfers have been defined as potential war crimes and
crimes against humanity; and the UN Security Council, which has progressively defined the movements of
refugees and internally displaced persons as potential threats to regional and international peace and security.
Critical to the Security Council response is the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, adopted by the UN
member states in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document. These four mechanisms provide a way to hold
states and individuals accountable for displacement. Generating political will to expand their use provides a
direct way of ensuring that refugees and other forced migrants are better protected.
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Executive Summary
How should we respond to states that deliberately 
displace their own populations? While the 
international refugee regime is anchored in the 1951 
Refugee Convention and the work of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
the Convention is silent on the question of state 
culpability, and the UNHCR’s Statute established 
its entirely non-political character. However, four 
forms of complementary enforcement mechanisms 
exist that could be used to limit and deter 
deliberate displacement by states: the UN Human 
Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR) 
mechanism; soft and regional law, such as the 
UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement; 
international criminal law at the individual level, 
where deportation and forcible transfers have been 
defined as potential war crimes and crimes against 
humanity; and the UN Security Council, which has 
progressively defined the movements of refugees 
and internally displaced persons (IDPs) as potential 
threats to regional and international peace and 
security. Critical to the Security Council response 
is the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, 
adopted by the UN member states in the 2005 
World Summit Outcome Document. Importantly, 
all four of these mechanisms already exist, but 
they have only rarely been used to hold states 
and individuals accountable for displacement. 
Thus, generating political will to expand their use 
provides a direct way of ensuring that refugees 
and other forced migrants are better protected. 
Introduction
Accountability “implies that some actors 
have the right to hold other actors to a set of 
standards, to judge whether they have fulfilled 
their responsibilities in light of these standards, 
and to impose sanctions if they determine 
that these responsibilities have not been met” 
(Grant and Keohane 2005, 29). The concept of 
accountability, by its nature, is multi-faceted, 
raising a series of questions around both which 
actors should be held accountable and what 
processes should be used. When it comes to 
forced displacement, states are rarely held to 
account by the international community writ 
large, individual international actors or other 
states. However, this paper argues that a range 
of mechanisms exist today that can be used to 
hold states directly accountable for deliberate 
actions that displace their own populations. 
The international refugee regime is designed 
to provide legal status and international 
protection to those people who have fled from 
their own states “owing to well-founded fear of 
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion, is outside the country 
of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such 
fear, unwilling to avail himself of the protection 
of that country” (UNGA 1951, art. 1A(2)).
This regime is silent on the issue of state 
accountability for displacement.1 The Convention 
established no treaty-monitoring body and, as 
Grant Dawson and Sonia Farber have noted, “it 
does not, and was not intended to, place any 
positive obligation on governments to refrain 
from displacing individuals within their borders 
or to apprehend those who commit forcible 
displacement within their borders” (Dawson and 
Farber 2012, 59; italics in the original). Similarly, 
the UNHCR’s Statute specified that “the work of 
the High Commissioner shall be of an entirely 
non-political character; it shall be humanitarian 
and social and shall relate, as a rule, to groups and 
categories of refugees” (UNGA 1950, chap. 1, para. 2). 
Further, creating an accountability mechanism 
within this regime might create more problems 
than it solves. Asylum is viewed as a neutral 
act. As Walter Kälin (2000, 423) has written, 
“In international law, the granting of asylum is 
traditionally regarded not as an unfriendly act 
vis-a-vis the country of origin, but as an exercise 
of territorial sovereignty allowing each State to 
decide freely about the admission of aliens. In 
contrast, the accountability view presupposes 
a violation of basic duties by the country of 
origin, turning every grant of asylum into an 
implicit accusation against that country.” 
Not only might a direct accountability mechanism 
affect states’ willingness to provide refugees 
1 The difference here in relation to other human rights treaties is quite stark. 
The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, for example, explicitly notes that “each State 
Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other 
measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction” 
(UNGA 1987, art. 2(1)).
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with asylum, but it could also undermine the 
UNHCR’s efforts to operate within states-of-
origin to both safeguard the rights of returnee 
refugees and IDPs. This could be an especially 
significant risk in cases where states are 
not signatories to the 1951 Convention. 
At the same time, there are clear general 
prohibitions in international law against forced 
displacement. The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights establishes that “everyone has a right to 
freedom of movement and residence within the 
borders of each state” and the right to leave any 
country and to return to one’s own country, as 
well as a right to seek asylum from persecution 
(UNGA 1948b, art. 13(1), (2), 14(1)). The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights affirms 
the freedom of movement and residence within 
a country and to leave any country, although it 
does limit this for reasons of national security 
and other concerns (UNGA 1966, art. 12).
The Genocide Convention explicitly establishes that 
the forcible transfer of children from one group 
to another and that acts that are “deliberately 
inflicting on the groups conditions of life calculated 
to bring about its physical destruction in whole 
or in part” both constitute genocide (UNGA 1948a, 
art. 2(e)). This has led some legal commentators 
to suggest that forms of forcible displacement 
used in such a way could constitute genocide; 
however, it is unclear how wide this category may 
be (Dawson and Farber 2012, 57; Boot 2002, 451).
International humanitarian law2 also prohibits a 
number of forms of displacement, including the 
“forced displacement of civilians and subsequent 
resettlement of the occupying power’s own 
population in occupied territory” (Jacques 
2012, 79) through individual or mass forcible 
transfers, as well as deportations of protected 
persons to the territory of the occupying power 
or to another country (see Henckaerts and 
Doswald-Beck 2005, 458–60). And, as will be 
discussed further below, the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) finds that 
deportation and forcible transfers can qualify as 
both crimes against humanity and war crimes. 
Thus, while direct accountability mechanisms 
do not exist within the international refugee 
regime, these other bodies of law provide for 
2 See the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons 
in Time of War (International Committee of the Red Cross 1949, art. 49).
four complementary accountability mechanisms 
that can be used in situations where either states 
or individuals — including senior state leaders 
and elites — deliberately displace their own 
populations.3 Further, two of these mechanisms 
can also be used as a means of enforcing current 
international law. While these mechanisms can 
also be used to hold state leaders accountable 
for wider atrocity crimes, my focus here is 
specifically on establishing direct accountability 
mechanisms for deliberate forced displacement. 
The first mechanism is through the UN Human 
Rights Council’s UPR mechanism, under 
which member states’ human rights practices 
are reviewed every four and a half years and 
in which a number of countries have been 
criticized for their policies toward refugees and 
their own internally displaced populations. 
The second mechanism is through established 
regional and soft law. While regional refugee law 
— including the 1969 Organization of African Unity 
(OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects 
of Refugee Problems in Africa (OAU Convention) 
and the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees 
(Cartagena Declaration)4 — expand the refugee 
definition, they do not create accountability 
mechanisms. By contrast, regional and soft law 
around issues of internal displacement have been 
much clearer, establishing both a legal definition 
of arbitrary displacement and viewing such 
forms of displacement as prohibited behaviour. 
The African Union’s (AU’s) 2009 Convention 
for the Protection and Assistance of Internally 
Displaced Persons in Africa (the Kampala 
Convention), in particular, provides a potential 
model for other regionally based processes.
The third mechanism is through international 
criminal law, whereby individuals can be charged 
for violations of the Genocide Convention, for 
war crimes and for crimes against humanity. 
Two forms of forced displacement — deportation 
3 The term “complementary accountability mechanisms” is used 
deliberately here as an analogy to “complementary protection” for 
refugees, which, as Jane McAdam notes, “denotes protection granted 
to individuals on the basis of a legal obligation other than the principal 
refugee treaty. In contemporary practice, it describes the engagement 
of States’ legal protection obligations that are complementary to those 
assumed under the 1951 Refugee Convention (as supplemented by its 
1967 Protocol), whether derived from treaty or customary international 
law” (McAdam 2007, 2-3; italics in original).
4 See, respectively, OAU (1969) and Regional Refugee Instruments & 
Related (1984).
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and forcible transfers — can constitute both war 
crimes and crimes against humanity, including 
within the ICC’s Rome Statute and within the 
statutes and case law of a number of international 
tribunals and special and joint courts. 
Finally, the fourth mechanism is through the 
UN Security Council, which has progressively 
defined refugee and IDP movements as potential 
threats to regional and international peace 
and security. Critical to the Security Council 
response is the R2P doctrine, adopted by the 
UN member states in the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome Document. It establishes that states 
have a responsibility to protect their own 
populations from four mass atrocity crimes — 
genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity — each of which can have 
displacement elements within it. The international 
community has a duty to assist states in fulfilling 
this responsibility. In situations where states 
are manifestly failing their responsibilities, the 
UN Security Council can take actions under 
chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations 
(“Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, 
Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression”).
The UPR Mechanism
Accountability for forced displacement sits 
uncomfortably within the United Nations’ 
human rights frameworks. Unlike the core 
human rights treaties, there are no existing 
committees to monitor implementation of the 
Refugee Convention. IDPs are protected only 
by the soft law Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement, and while there is a UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally 
Displaced Persons, Cecilia Jimenez-Damary, her 
mandate focuses primarily on dialogue with 
governments (UN Human Rights Council 2016).
The UN Human Rights Council has strong 
mechanisms for investigating potential human 
rights abuses on a case-by-case basis, including 
through its ability to adopt country-specific 
resolutions, to appoint independent fact-finding 
missions and to create commissions of inquiry. 
These can serve an important role in documenting 
abuses. For example, the Independent International 
Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar tabled their 
report on August 24, 2018, and found strong 
evidence that the Myanmar military, the Tatmadaw, 
had been “the main perpetrator of serious human 
rights violations and crimes under international 
law” (UN Human Rights Council 2018b, para. 90). 
These included acts of forced displacement that 
could constitute both crimes against humanity 
and war crimes. But the Mission also found that 
“the crimes in Rakhine State, and the manner 
in which they were perpetrated, are similar in 
nature, gravity and scope to those that have 
allowed genocidal intent to be established in 
other contexts” (ibid., para. 85). However, on the 
question of accountability for these crimes, the 
report could only conclude that the UN Security 
Council “should ensure accountability…by referring 
the situation to the International Criminal Court or, 
alternatively, by creating an ad hoc international 
criminal tribunal. Furthermore, the Security 
Council should adopt targeted individual sanctions, 
including travel bans and asset freezes, against 
those who appear most responsible for serious 
crimes under international law” (ibid., para. 105).
The Human Rights Council can also use special 
sessions to focus on specific protection issues. 
However, while these had been envisioned as 
addressing both thematic issues and country-
specific situations, the “vast overwhelming 
majority” have focused on country-specific 
situations and have been subject to politicization 
(Freedman and Houghton 2017). 
One avenue by which to raise accountability 
for forced displacement is through the UPR. The 
UPR has the goal of ensuring that all UN member 
states be subject to review on a cyclical basis 
every four and a half years. The basis for the 
UPR includes the Charter of the United Nations, 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and human rights instruments to which the 
reviewed state is a party. While the 1951 Refugee 
Convention is not included as a human rights 
treaty, it is included within the process as another 
“main relevant international instrument,” and, 
as noted above, a number of core human rights 
instruments include language-reaffirming freedom 
of movement and the right to seek asylum. 
This mechanism is notable in three ways. First, 
it produces a wealth of information. Both the 
state under review and the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights produce reports 
as part of the process. It also allows for submissions 
from both non-governmental organizations 
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(NGOs) and national human rights institutions. 
Other states have the opportunity to participate 
in the review and to make recommendations to 
the state under review. Second, the state under 
review has an opportunity to indicate which 
recommendations it supports, and the state’s 
implementation of these recommendations is 
tracked in the next review cycle (UN Human 
Rights Council 2007). Third, and perhaps most 
importantly, the UPR presumes universal coverage 
of all states. While only Human Rights Council 
members are required to be reviewed, so far all UN 
member states have participated in the process.
States have used this recommendation process 
in three ways. The first has been to specifically 
call out incidents of forced displacement. As 
part of Angola’s first review cycle, Australia 
recommended that it “immediately cease, in 
accordance with the Guiding Principles on 
Internal Displacement 1998, all forms of forced 
displacement,” a recommendation the Angolan 
government accepted but failed to implement; 
in its second review cycle, Australia repeated 
the recommendation: “Immediately cease all 
forms of forced displacement, in accordance with 
the applicable international humanitarian and 
human rights law and the Guiding Principles 
on Internal Displacement (1998).”5 Colombia 
similarly accepted recommendations from 
Austria, Canada, Italy, Ireland and Portugal 
that it prosecute forced displacements and 
take action to stop their occurrences.6 
Second, states have also encouraged the adoption 
of relevant laws and standards, including the 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. 
For example, in Myanmar’s first review cycle 
in 2011, New Zealand recommended that the 
government “implement and enforce the right 
not to be arbitrarily displaced and the Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement.”7 However, 
the UPR database only includes eight such 
recommendations, which suggests that such 
recommendations are not yet widely used. 
Recommendations have also been made around 
durable solutions, such as encouraging the 
return of refugees. Finally, states have frequently 
encouraged the return of refugees. For example, 
5 See UPR Database of Recommendations, www.upr-info.org/database/.
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid.
Switzerland recommended that Bhutan “take 
the necessary measures to allow the Bhutanese 
refugees who wish to return to Bhutan to do so 
safely and in conditions that respect their rights.”8
The third is that states have increasingly used 
information provided by non-state actors within 
the specific recommendation process.9 The concerns 
over the need to prosecute forced displacement 
in Colombia, for example, came directly out of 
a joint submission by a number of Colombian 
human rights and democracy organizations, 
which was included within the stakeholders 
summary created by the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (2013, para. 85). 
The UPR process is certainly not perfect. First, 
it offers only a longer-term accountability 
mechanism, since states are only examined once 
every four and a half years. Second, while all 
states are participating in the process, this does 
not mean they accept recommendations. In the 
first review cycle, North Korea did not accept 
a single recommendation, and Israel accepted 
only three (Kälin 2014, 31). Finally, while a 
number of states — including Australia, Austria, 
Canada, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, Portugal 
and Switzerland — have made recommendations 
around forced displacement issues, this practice 
remains ad hoc and inconsistently applied. 
The UPR process, therefore, is important both in 
the ways that it can bring forward information 
related to refugees and IDPs on a state-by-state 
basis, and for providing a venue for state-based 
recommendations and commitments to improve 
human rights practices within states. But it alone 
cannot provide for adequate accountability. 
8 Ibid. 
9 NGO reports are also filtering into other human rights processes. The US 
Department of State Annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 
for example, now routinely include sections on the situation of refugees 
and IDPs within the state, drawing on reports from a range of human 
rights NGOs (see www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2016/index.htm).
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Regional and Soft Law 
Protections for IDPs 
As noted above, the 1951 Refugee Convention 
does not provide accountability mechanisms for 
states that produce refugees. Regional measures 
for refugees similarly lack these accountability 
mechanisms. The 1969 OAU Convention expanded 
the refugee definition to include every person who 
was compelled to seek refuge outside their country 
of origin for reasons including “external aggression, 
occupation, foreign domination or events seriously 
disturbing public order” (art. I(2)) but stated that 
the granting of asylum “shall not be regarded as 
an unfriendly act by any Member State” (art. 2(2)). 
The 1984 Cartagena Declaration similarly expanded 
the refugee definition by including “generalized 
violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, 
massive violation of human rights or other 
circumstances which have seriously disturbed 
public order” (Regional Refugee Instruments & 
Related 1984, para. 3), but also confirmed the “non-
political and exclusively humanitarian nature of 
grant of asylum” and noted that this should not 
“be interpreted as an unfriendly act towards the 
country of origin of refugees” (ibid., para. 4).
By contrast, the soft law United Nations Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement offers an 
alternative model that clearly indicates which 
forms of displacement should be prohibited. 
Principle 6 establishes that “every human 
being shall have the right to be protected 
against being arbitrarily displaced from his or 
her home or place of habitual residence.” 
The Principles include five non-
exhaustive situations in which 
displacement would be arbitrary: 
(a) When it is based on policies of 
apartheid, “ethnic cleansing” or similar 
practices aimed at or resulting in 
alteration of the ethnic, religious or racial 
composition of the affected population; 
(b) In situations of armed conflict, unless 
the security of the civilians involved or 
imperative military reasons so demand; 
(c) In cases of large-scale development 
projects that are not justified by 
compelling and overriding public interests; 
(d) In cases of disasters, unless the 
safety and health of those affected 
requires their evacuation; and 
(e) When it is used as a 
collective punishment.
(Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs 1999, Principle 6)
The Kampala Convention has been ratified by 27 
and signed by 40 of the 54 member states of the 
AU.10 The Kampala Convention adopts wholesale 
the arbitrary displacement definition of the Guiding 
Principles, but also requires that “State Parties 
shall declare as offences punishable by law acts of 
arbitrary displacement that amount to genocide, 
war crimes or crimes against humanity.”11 The 
Convention also establishes that state parties 
have an obligation to protect the rights of IDPs by 
refraining from and preventing “genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes and other violations 
of international humanitarian law against internally 
displaced persons.”12 The Convention also reaffirms 
the powers of the AU to intervene in situations 
of war crimes, genocide and crimes against 
humanity, as established in the AU’s Constitutive 
Act, article 4(h).13 And the Convention introduces 
a remedies clause, establishing that “State Parties 
shall provide persons affected by displacement 
with effective remedies” including compensation 
and reparations frameworks at the domestic level 
“in accordance with international standards.”14 
The Convention introduces several mechanisms to 
monitor implementation and compliance. The first 
is a Conference of State Parties, which is tasked 
to enhance cooperation. The Conference only 
met for the first time in April 2017 but has now 
committed to developing a five-year plan of action 
to strengthen regional and national measures to 
prevent internal displacement and improve durable 
10 African Union, List of Countries which have signed/ ratified/acceded 
to the African Union’s Convention for the Protection and Assistance of 
Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, 15 June 2017, https://au.int/
sites/default/files/treaties/7796-sl-african_union_convention_for_the_
protection_and_assistance_of_internally.pdf.
11 AU 2009, art. 4(6).
12 Ibid., art. 9 1(b).
13 Ibid., art. 8 (1). 
14 Ibid., art. 12 (1) and (2). It also includes a further clause that “State 
Party shall be liable to make reparation…when such a State Party refrains 
from protecting and assisting internally displaced persons in the event of 
natural disasters.” Ibid., art. 12 (3).
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solutions (AU 2017). The Convention also includes 
a requirement that state parties indicate any 
legislative and other measures when presenting 
their reports under the article 62 process of the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(OAU 1981). However, this process has historically 
been poorly upheld, with a number of states 
having either never submitted a report or being 
decades behind on their reporting responsibilities. 
Since the Convention has come into force, only 11 
of the 23 submitted reports mention IDPs; nine, 
however, do point to some forms of concrete 
legislative and policy changes toward IDPs. 
Finally, in the event of a dispute or difference 
arising from the interpretation or application of 
the Convention, states are encouraged to settle 
the matter amicably. Otherwise, it is possible 
for a state party to refer another state party to 
either the Conference or the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights.15 However, neither 
process has yet been used (Orchard 2016, 311–14). 
While these mechanisms are not yet in wide use, 
the Kampala Convention’s use of regional hard 
law represents one approach to create better 
accountability mechanisms for state responsibility 
in situations of forced displacement. This model 
could be used in two ways. The first is that other 
regions could seek to strengthen their own regional 
hard law measures to ensure accountability. 
The Organization of American States (OAS) is 
the most likely regional organization to follow 
such a model. While the OAS has not drafted a 
specific instrument, article 22 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights establishes rights 
around freedom of movement and residence, 
including the right to seek and be granted asylum 
(OAS 1969). As the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights has noted, “the organs of 
the inter-American human rights system have 
found in their case law that this right creates an 
obligation upon the States to abstain from actions 
that will lead to the displacement of persons 
or aid third parties in perpetuating events that 
trigger internal displacement” (Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights 2013, para. 537).
While hard law frameworks may not work in all 
regions, informal approaches can also provide 
at least a measure of accountability. Within 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), there is a lack of formal mechanisms 
15 AU (2009, art. 22 (1-2)). 
to address forced displacement. However, 
the 2012 ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, 
while limited, recognizes rights of “freedom of 
movement and residence within the borders of 
each State,” and “the right to seek and receive 
asylum in another State in accordance with the 
laws of such State and applicable international 
agreements.”16 And while bodies such as the 
ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human 
Rights (AICHR) have only limited capabilities, 
organizations like the ASEAN Parliamentarians for 
Human Rights, composed of current and former 
parliamentarians, have used forced displacement 
situations to argue for mandate expansion.17 
The Kampala Convention represents a clear path 
for accountability frameworks to be created at 
the regional level. While the Convention itself is 
only being limited slowly, it provides an important 
model that can be used to generate similar 
frameworks elsewhere. Given its existing human 
rights architecture, the OAS is most likely the next 
region that could adopt similar mechanisms. At 
the same time, linking accountability to forced 
migration can also work through more informal 
processes, such as the role of the AICHR. 
International Criminal 
Law 
The development of international criminal law also 
provides for both accountability and enforcement 
mechanisms against individuals who engage in 
some forms of forced displacement. As noted 
above, both international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law have introduced 
prohibitions against some forms of displacement. 
When the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established 
in May 1993, its Statute provided that the ICTY 
16 ASEAN (2012, art. 10-11, 14-15).
17 In a 2015 report examining the ongoing persecution of the Rohingya in 
Myanmar, the organization argued that the crisis demonstrated the need 
to expand “the mandate of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on 
Human Rights (AICHR) to include country visits, inquiries, complaints, and 
emergency protection mechanisms, and ensure adequate independence 
and staffing support for its members” (ASEAN Parliamentarians for 
Human Rights 2015, 4).
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could prosecute individuals for grave breaches 
of the Geneva Conventions, including “unlawful 
deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement 
of a civilian” (UN 2009, art. 2(g)). It also provided 
for the prosecution of crimes against humanity, 
“when committed in armed conflict, whether 
international or internal in character, and directed 
against any civilian population:…(d) deportation…
(h) persecutions on political, racial and religious 
grounds (i) other inhumane acts” (ibid., art. 5), 
where other inhumane acts were viewed to include 
forcible transfers.18 In order for these acts to be 
considered as crimes against humanity, they must 
be directed at a civilian population, be organized, 
systemic and of a certain scale and gravity.19 
The Rome Statute of the ICC includes “deportation 
or forcible transfer of population” as a crime against 
humanity “when committed as part of a widespread 
or systematic attack directed against any civilian 
population, with knowledge of the attack” (UNGA 
1998, art. 7(1)(d)).20 It defines deportation or forcible 
transfer as “forced displacement of the persons 
concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from 
the area in which they are lawfully present, without 
grounds permitted under international law.”21
However, the record of criminal prosecutions is less 
well developed. While the ICTY had a number of 
successful convictions for these crimes, the majority 
of cases were linked directly to genocide, especially 
as a result of the events at Srebrenica, or to a range 
of crimes committed during the Kosovo War. The 
record at the ICC is similarly limited. No defendant 
has yet been charged with forcible transfers or 
deportations as a war crime. Further, only in three 
situations — the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Kenya and Sudan — have defendants been charged 
with deportation or forcible transfers as a crime 
against humanity. In two of these situations, either 
18 Kupreskic et al, IT-95-16, Judgment (14 January 2000) at para 566 
(International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber), 
online: www.icty.org/x/cases/kupreskic/tjug/en/kup-tj000114e.pdf.
19 Nikolic, T-94-2-R61, Review of Indictment (20 October 1995) at para 26 
(International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber), 
online: www.icty.org/x/cases/dragan_nikolic/tord/en/951020.pdf.
20 UNGA (1998, art. 7(1)(d)). 
21 Ibid., art. 7(2)(d). It is important to note that individual perpetrators 
could also be held accountable for international crimes of deportation 
or forcible transfers under the principle of universal jurisdiction (Meron 
2018, 437-38). The Canadian Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes 
Act (SC 2000, c 24, s 6.1.3), for example, allows for the prosecution of 
individuals who have committed crimes against humanity or war crimes 
outside of Canada, where crimes against humanity specifically includes 
deportation.
none of the individuals have been brought before 
the court or the case has been withdrawn, while 
one trial (that of Bosco Ntaganda) is under way.22
At the same time, a major shift is occurring in 
how the ICC understands deportation. On April 9, 
2018, the Office of the Prosecutor requested 
a ruling on jurisdiction from the Court with 
respect to the deportation of the Rohingya from 
Myanmar to Bangladesh. The Rome Statute 
treats coercive acts as occurring within the 
territory of a particular state, and Myanmar is 
not a party to the Rome Statute. In this case, 
however, the prosecutor’s office argued that 
the Court may exercise jurisdiction “because an 
essential legal element of the crime — crossing 
an international border — occurred on the 
territory of a State which is a party to the Rome 
Statute (Bangladesh)” (ICC 2018, para. 2). 
In September, the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber ruled in 
favour of the prosecutor’s request, agreeing that 
because the crime of deportation requires transport 
to another state and that deportation had an 
“inherently transboundary nature,” the prosecutor 
did have jurisdiction to investigate the situation. 
The nature of the decision means that a range of 
other situations of forced deportations could now 
be within the Court’s jurisdiction, providing one 
of the receiving states was a party to the Rome 
Statute, and so it may have indirectly created 
another referral mechanism for those states (Colvin 
and Orchard 2018). This question has already been 
raised around Syria, where Jordan has accepted 
hundreds of thousands of refugees and is a Rome 
Statute party (Vigneswaran and Zarifi 2018).
Thus, the ICC has an established capacity to ensure 
that individual perpetrators of some forms of forced 
displacement — deportations and forcible transfers, 
which constitute war crimes and crimes against 
humanity — are held accountable for their actions. 
However, there remains a gap between this capacity 
and the number of cases that have been pursued. 
22 With respect to the situation in Kenya, in two prosecutions — including 
Ruto, Kosgey and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-373) and Muthaura, Kenyatta, 
and Ali (ICC-01/09-02/11-382) — all defendants were charged with 
deportation or forcible transfer of population constituting a crime against 
humanity, but all charges have been withdrawn. In the situation of Sudan, 
three prosecutions — including Al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-1) and Harun 
and Abd-Al-Rahman (ICC-02/05-01/07) and Hussein (ICC-02/05-01/12) 
— have led to charges of forcible transfer constituting a crime against 
humanity; none of the defendants are under arrest. See Colvin and 
Orchard (n.d.). 
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The R2P Doctrine 
The R2P doctrine establishes that each state, as well 
as the international community as a whole, has the 
responsibility to protect populations from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity. In situations when national authorities 
are manifestly failing to uphold this responsibility, 
the UN Security Council can take actions to protect 
those populations in accordance with the UN 
Charter, including through chapter VII (UNGA 2005;  
2009, 17). There is a clear linkage between these 
mass atrocity crimes and forced displacement; not 
only does “displacement almost always [occur] 
as a result of the four crimes included in the R2P 
concept,” but displacement can serve as an early 
warning sign that mass atrocities are occurring 
(Ferris 2016, 394). The Secretary-General’s 2009 
report on the R2P (UNGA 2009, 17) directly drew 
linkages between forced displacement and the 
R2P. It noted that asylum could provide one 
route for protection from mass atrocity crimes 
and also that the protection of refugees and 
IDPs was a direct goal of the R2P (ibid., 29).23
In that report, the Secretary-General reformulated 
the R2P doctrine in line with three distinct pillars. 
The first pillar reflects “the enduring responsibility 
of the State to protect its populations, whether 
nationals or not, from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity, and from 
their incitement.” The second pillar reflects the 
“commitment of the international community to 
assist States in meeting those obligations.” Finally, 
the third pillar articulates the “the responsibility of 
Member States to respond collectively in a timely 
and decisive manner when a State is manifestly 
failing to provide such protection” (ibid., 8-9).
We have begun to see the R2P doctrine invoked to 
respond to forced displacement situations. While 
chapter VII of the UN Charter will be invoked rarely 
at best, the use of the second pillar represents 
another way in which the international community 
can take direct action to respond to forced 
displacement. Two cases highlight how this can 
function. The international response to the post-
election violence and resulting humanitarian crisis 
in Kenya in December 2007, which saw 300,000 
people displaced and up to 1,500 people killed, is 
23 On the links between mass atrocities and asylum, see Barbour and 
Gorlick (2008).
today widely seen as an excellent example of the 
second pillar at work (Welsh 2013, 389). In that 
case, a troika of eminent persons led by former UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan were able to convince 
the two political sides to agree to a power-sharing 
arrangement that ended the violence. Annan later 
noted he saw “the crisis in the R2P prism with a 
Kenyan government unable to contain the situation 
or protect its people. I know that if the international 
community did not intervene, things would go 
hopelessly wrong…Kenya is a successful example 
of R2P at work” (Bellamy 2011, 54). Therefore, 
such actions by a range of international actors — 
including the United Nations, other international 
organizations and NGOs — and by states can play 
an important role in preventing or stopping crises 
from contributing to widespread displacement. 
Another successful use of the second pillar was in 
Côte d’Ivoire in March 2011. After President Laurent 
Gbagbo was unwilling to accept his electoral defeat 
and violence led to the creation of more than one 
million IDPs, the UN Security Council recognized 
the victor, Alanssane Ouattara, as forming 
the legitimate government. The UN Security 
Council (2011, 3) then reaffirmed Côte d’Ivoire’s 
responsibility to protect its own population and 
authorized the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, an 
8,000-person mission that had been in the country 
since 2003, “to use all necessary means” to protect 
civilians, including by preventing the “use of heavy 
weapons against the civilian population.” With 
French support, the mission defeated Gbagbo, 
who was charged with four counts of crimes 
against humanity, including rape, murder and 
persecution, although not with forcible transfers 
(ICC 2015; Bellamy and Williams 2011). He was 
tried at the ICC and acquitted in January 2019.
At the same time, efforts to use the third pillar 
in situations where forced displacement cross 
into mass atrocity crimes should not be ignored 
entirely. In the 1990s, multilateral interventions 
occurred in both Northern Iraq and Kosovo in 
order to respond to large-scale refugee flows 
triggered by atrocity crimes, neither of which 
were approved by the Security Council (Orchard 
2010). The 2011 humanitarian intervention in 
Libya, while not undertaken to respond to forced 
displacement, represented the first and, so far, 
only use by the Security Council of chapter VII to 
respond to atrocity crimes. Concerns over the use 
of the R2P in that situation are widely seen to have 
limited the Council’s response to Syria, including 
9Making States Accountable for Deliberate Forced Displacement
through China and Russia’s repeated use of the 
veto. And yet this is a case where the Independent 
International Commission of Inquiry has found 
that “in the majority of cases documented by the 
Commission, displacement was directly induced 
by the unlawful behaviour of warring parties. Such 
conduct included both unlawful attacks, which 
caused civilians to flee their homes in fear and 
desperation, and forced displacements pursuant 
to ‘evacuation agreements’ negotiated between 
warring parties and reached as part of local truces” 
(UN Human Rights Council 2018a, para. 64). 
While the Council continues to regularly refer 
to R2P (Gifkins 2016, 157-60), these concerns 
have led to two initiatives to limit the use of 
the veto in situations of atrocity crimes. The 
Accountability, Coherence, and Transparency 
(ACT) Group initiative has proposed a Security 
Council code of conduct whereby signatory states 
would commit not to vote against resolutions 
aimed to prevent or respond to genocide, war 
crimes or crimes against humanity (ACT Group 
2015). As of June 2018, the code of conduct has 
been signed by 115 member states (Permanent 
Mission of the Principality of Liechtenstein 2018). 
In 2013, the French government made a separate 
declaration to call for permanent members of the 
Security Council to agree to suspend their right 
to veto. The French proposal would see the UN 
Secretary-General investigate situations following 
a request from at least 50 member states. Where 
the Secretary-General determined that atrocity 
crimes were occurring, the permanent members 
would voluntarily regulate their right to exercise 
their veto (Fabius 2013; France and Mexico 2015). 
That declaration has received the support of 96 
states, including the United Kingdom (Global 
Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, n.d.).
Consequently, the R2P doctrine can be used by the 
UN Security Council to respond to some situations 
of forced displacement that cross into mass atrocity 
crimes. While interventions under chapter VII will 
be rare, it also has the capacity to assist states to 
uphold their responsibilities to avoid such crimes 
and to stop them when they do commence. 
Conclusions and 
Recommendations
While the international refugee regime lacks 
mechanisms to hold states accountable for the 
displacement of their own populations, this paper 
presents the argument that four complementary 
accountability mechanisms do exist: the UPR 
process, soft and regional law processes, 
international criminal law and, finally, action 
through the R2P doctrine. These mechanisms 
share the advantage that they already exist. They 
also provide linkages between issues of forced 
displacement and other areas of practice, including 
human rights, international criminal law, soft 
law, regional law and the R2P doctrine. These 
mechanisms would not be usable in all cases of 
forced displacement — in particular, international 
criminal law and the R2P doctrine would only 
apply in the gravest cases where mass atrocities 
occur. However, even simply by raising the 
profile of the issue, these mechanisms may have 
positive and lasting effect on state behaviour. 
Therefore, the World Refugee Council can play an 
important role in advocating for the expanded 
use of these existing accountability mechanisms 
to respond to displacement situations. 
The World Refugee Council should: 
 → Encourage governments to use the UPR’s 
recommendation process to highlight 
the issue of accountability for refugees 
and IDPs with individual states. 
• States that have previously used the 
recommendation process in such a way 
— including Australia, Austria, Canada, 
Italy, Ireland, New Zealand, Portugal and 
Switzerland — are to be commended, 
but should be encouraged to both 
use the process systematically and to 
advocate for such recommendations to 
be normalized within the UPR process. 
 → Identify and encourage NGO and national 
human rights institutions’ submissions to 
the UPR process that highlight refugee and 
IDP situations in specific country contexts.
 → Encourage member states of the AU to 
sign and ratify the Kampala Convention 
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and encourage them to participate within 
its accountability mechanisms. 
 → Encourage other regional organizations such 
as the OAS to use the Kampala Convention 
as a model for developing regional-level legal 
mechanisms to assist and protect refugees 
and IDPs with the inclusion of clear state 
accountability mechanisms and linkages to 
other human rights processes; in contexts where 
legal conventions are unlikely to be advanced, 
advocate instead for more informal processes, 
such as inclusion of forced displacement 
within existing human rights mechanisms.
 → Support ICC efforts to charge individuals with 
deportation and forcible transfers as crimes 
against humanity and war crimes, including by 
advocating for increased resources for the ICC. 
 → Encourage signatory member states to engage 
in referral of cases involving deportations to the 
Court in line with its jurisdiction interpretation. 
 → Advocate for the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor, 
states and the UN Security Council to pursue 
charges of deportation and forcible transfers 
through the Court’s referral mechanisms. 
 → Advocate for ongoing efforts within the United 
Nations, including through the UN Office on 
Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility 
to Protect doctrine, to view displacement 
situations that cross the threshold of atrocity 
crimes to be viewed through the prism of the 
R2P doctrine, including its three pillars. 
 → Encourage UN actors, other international 
organizations and states to assist those 
countries that have displacement 
situations to ensure they uphold their 
responsibilities under the R2P doctrine.
 → Support existing state efforts, including the 
ACT Code of Conduct and the 2015 French and 
Mexico Political Declaration, to limit the use of 
the veto in the Security Council in displacement 
situations that fall under the R2P doctrine. 
 → Suggest the creation of a resolution to 
guide UN Security Council responses under 
chapter VII of the Charter in situations 
with widespread displacement. 
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